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George W. Hardy, III*
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE MINERAL INTERESTS
The controversy between Leiter Minerals, Inc., and the Cali-
fornia Company has a long and varied history and has by this
time become almost a career for the attorneys involved. To date
it has labored its way through at least seven hearings in six dif-
ferent courts over a period of ten years.' It is now apparently
pending on appeal on its second trip to the top of the federal
court system. 2 No pointed observations as to the law's delays
or the problems of state-federal relations are pertinent here, but
the history of the case itself gives some mute but brutal testi-
mony on these points.
The problem which has spawned all of these multitudinous
hearings, resultant opinions, and difficulties for the parties in-
volved centers on a reservation of minerals by Thomas Leiter in
a conveyance of land to the United States in 1938. Briefly, the
reservation was for an initial period of ten years with a limita-
tion of seven years on the right to enter the lands for the pur-
pose of mining and removing minerals. Extension of the rights
reserved beyond the basic ten-year period was dependent upon
a condition that operations be carried on for an average of at
least fifty days for each of the preceding three years. If such a
condition were fulfilled, the rights were to be continued in ex-
istence for a further period of five years with the limitation
that the extended right should be limited to an area of twenty-
five acres around each producing well. Further five-year exten-
sions were possible upon fulfillment of the condition requiring
an annual average of fifty operating days for each five-year
period.
In 1940, the Louisiana legislature passed Act 315, now R.S.
9:5806A, providing that upon acquisition of land by the United
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Four hearings have been held in federal courts: United States v. Leiter
Minerals, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. La. 1954) ; 224 F. 2d 381 (5th Cir. 1955) ;
352 U.S. 220 (1957); 202 F.Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Three hearings have
been held in the Louisiana state courts: the unreported district court hearing;
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 126 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961)
241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).




States by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or expro-
priation, mineral rights reserved in any such transaction or in
any prior transaction shall be imprescriptible.
Neither Thomas Leiter nor his successors in title exercised
the mineral rights reserved in 1938. In 1949, the United States
leased the property acquired from Leiter, and highly successful
drilling operations followed.
The predictable result of this success was litigation, but it
is doubtful that anyone involved foresaw the opening of Pan-
dora's box when Leiter Minerals first filed a petitory action in
the District Court for Plaquemines Parish in 1953 seeking to be
declared owner of the mineral rights in the lands conveyed in
1938. This action named the federal lessees as defendants but
did not name the United States as a party. Soon thereafter, the
United States instituted an action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting its title to
the mineral rights. Also sought and obtained by the federal gov-
ernment was an injunction against the state court action. The
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States District Court was
upheld in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals3 and ultimately by
the United States Supreme Court.4
It was the position of the United States that R.S. 9:5806
could not be held to apply to a conveyance in which the parties
themselves contracted for a reservation of specific duration and
that if the statute were construed to apply to the reservation
there would be an impairment of the obligations of the contract.
The United States Supreme Court noted that the Louisiana Su-
preme Court had not dealt with the precise issue presented and
expressed questions concerning the applicability of the statute
and the problems it was designed to meet, and whether it was
merely declaratory of prior jurisprudence or new legislation.
Desiring answers to these questions before proceeding to a de-
cision of the case, the United States Supreme Court stated, "we
think it advisable to have an interpretation, if possible, of the
statute by the only court that can interpret the statute with fi-
nality, the Louisiana Supreme Court," 5 and went on to suggest
the apparent availability of the Louisiana Declaratory Judg-
ments Act.
3. United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 224 F. 2d 381 (5th Cir. 1955).
4. United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
5. Id. at 229.
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Following the suggestion of the United States Supreme
Court, a declaratory judgment action was instituted in state
court. Ironically enough, the United States was not a party to
this action, nor did it intervene, or even appear as suggested by
Justice Frankfurter6
The state district court concluded that the statute was ap-
plicable, that the mineral rights were accordingly imprescrip-
tible, and that the statute was not unconstitutional. 7 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, declaring that the statute was
inapplicable, concluding that the parties had fixed a contractual
prescriptive period less than the prevailing statutory period of
ten years.8 Writs were granted by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
There are at least three aspects of this controversy and of
the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion which compel one's no-
tice and attention. Certainly, as previously indicated, the knotty
problems of state-federal relations so vividly apparent in this
case are of the first magnitude. However, any discussion of
these would necessarily have to be extended, and they are beyond
the scope of the mineral rights portion of this Symposium.
Second, there is a jurisdictional problem involved. This is
raised by the court's statement that "to us it is evident that in
this action, instituted pursuant to the directive of the United
States Supreme Court under the Louisiana Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, we are called upon to render only an advisory opin-
ion." (Emphasis added.) 9 This problem, too, is beyond the basic
scope of these comments. However, because it relates to the
value of the statutory interpretation by the court, it is not inap-
propriate in passing to pose three interesting questions arising
from the rendering of this "advisory opinion." Does the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court have authority of any kind to render an
advisory opinion to anyone? Its own opinions reflect that it has
previously considered that it did not. 10 Certainly, the court was
6. "The Louisiana declaratory judgment procedure appears available to secure
such an interpretation, . . . and the United States of course may appear to urge
its interpretation of the statute." Ibid.
7. The opinion rendered by Judge Nunez of the 25th Judicial District Court,
Parish of Plaquemines, is adopted as a dissent by Justice Hamlin. Leiter Min-
erals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 945, 132 So. 2d 845, 855 (1961).
8. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 126 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961).
9. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 928, 132 So. 2d 845,
849 (1961).
10. "In some states the Court of last resort renders advisory opinions at the
request of other departments of the Government, but not in this state." State
ex rel. Day v. Rapides Parish School Board, 158 La. 251, 259, 103 So. 757, 760
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in a dilemma as to whether it should (a) decide the case pre-
sented, to which the United States was not a party; (b) render
an "advisory opinion" without specific authorization; or (c)
refuse to render an "advisory opinion" and thus stalemate the
progress of the litigation, leaving the United States Supreme
Court as unenlightened as it had been before. There was dis-
agreement among the court as to the proper course of action.
Chief Justice Fournet and Justice Hamlin dissented from the
court's refusal to render a decision on all issues of the case, both
feeling that the district judge had correctly decided the case.11
On application for rehearing, Justice Summers joined the ranks
of the minority, taking the position that a rehearing should be
granted and a decision rendered on all issues.12
As to the propriety of issuing an advisory opinion generally,
there is some precedent in the conduct of the highest courts of
other states for the proposition that such a tribunal may render
advisory opinions in proper circumstances without specific
authorization.' s Other courts, however, have refused to render
such decisions in the absence of specific constitutional authority,
and this position appears to be in the majority. 4
(1925). See also State em rel. Bussie v. Fant, 216 La. 58, 43 So. 2d 217 (1950)
Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores, 207 La. 500, 21 So. 2d 510 (1945) ; Graham v.
Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So. 2d 761 (1941).
11. For the dissenting opinions see Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co.,
241 La. 915, 943, 132 So. 2d 845, 855 (1961).
12. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 958, 132 So. 2d 845,
860 (1961).
13. North Carolina has no constitutional provisions granting authority for
the issuance of advisory opinions. However, such opinions have been rendered
on a number of occasions. See Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina,
27 N.C.L. REV. 297 (1949). At one time advisory opinions were rendered in
several other states without specific authority; however, the practice seems to
have been abandoned. See ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE
GOVERNMENT 64-67, 71-76, 78 (1918).
14. For an authoritative commentary on the present status of the advisory
opinion the reader is referred to Stevens, Advisory Opinions -Present Status and
Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1959). See also Ellingwood, supra note
13; Note, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1302 (1956) ; Edsall, supra note 13; Field,
The Advisory Opinion -An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203 (1949). According to
the article by Dean Stevens cited above eleven states presently utilize the ad-
visory opinion. In seven of these authorization is specifically granted by the
state constitution; in two states it is granted by general statutes; in one state
limited authority is granted by statute; and in one state (North Carolina) ad-
visory opinions are rendered by judicial custom. This article also indicates that
such opinions are normally rendered upon the request of a coordinate branch of
the government. For the early rejection of advisory opinions by the federal gov-
ernment see the letters from Secretary of State Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay and
the Associate Justices and from Chief Justice Jay and the Associate Justices to
President Washington printed as Correspondence of the Justices (1793), in
HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 75 (1953).
Hart & Wechsler note occasional extra-judicial expressions of views, op. cit. supra
at 79-80. The question of more immediate significance in this case is the problem
of authorization to render an advisory opinion not to a coordinate branch of the
1963] PRIVATE LAW 327
The rendering of an "advisory opinion" and the division of
the court lead to the second question. Of what value is the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana to the courts of the
United States in resolving the controversy? 15 As a practical
matter, it seems that the federal tribunals will accept the statu-
tory interpretation, but there are some technical questions which
arise. These, too, are beyond the scope of this piece.
The third question is similar to the second. If there is no
authority to render an "advisory opinion," of what value is the
Supreme Court of Louisiana's interpretation of R.S. 9:5806A to
future Louisiana litigants? Again, the answer seems to be fur-
nished in practical fashion by the fact that all seven members
of the court were in agreement as to the interpretation of the
statute itself. Thus, certainly as long as the composition of the
court remains the same, or nearly so, it seems unlikely that there
will be any deviation from the interpretation exposed by the
"advisory opinion." Still, there are questions in the writer's
mind as to the value of this opinion as precedent in a technical
legal sense. If this opinion is one rendered without authoriza-
tion, are lower courts in the state system bound by it, and would
the Supreme Court itself be in any way bound by it if presented
with the same question in the future? Perhaps this puzzle is
academic, but it is nevertheless curious.
state government but to the United States Supreme Court. A specialized but
interesting aspect of this problem is raised by the Florida statute authorizing
certification of questions of state law to the Florida Supreme Court by federal
appellate courts, FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1959). The possibility of application
of this statute is raised in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207
(1960). For discussions of this case and of the statute see Pugh, Federal Juris-
diction and Practice, 1960 Annual Survey of American Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV.
142, 148 (1961); Kurland, Toward A Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The
Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489-92 (1959) ; Stearn, Con-
flict of Laws, 12 U. Mimi L. REV. 383, 395-98 (1958) ; Vestal, The Certified
Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REV. 629, 643 (1951); Note, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1358, 1368 (1960). Acting upon the suggestion of the United States Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified certain questions to
the Florida Supreme Court, which upheld the certification statute under the
Florida Constitution. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla.
1961), 36 TUL. L. REV. 571 (1962).
15. "There is authority in each of the eleven states using the advisory opinion
procedure to the effect that such opinions are advisory only, result in no judg-
ment or decree, and bind no one. If this be taken literally one wonders why an
advisory opinion is either sought or given.
"Legally, the statement is, as indicated, amply supported by authority. How-
ever, as a practical matter, not only the courts, but also the writers, recognize
that advisory opinions carry real weight. They are almost invariably accepted by
those who requested the opinion and are cited quite frequently in later cases both
at home and in other jurisdictions as authority." Stevens, supra note 14, at 6-7,
and authorities cited therein.
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Having gone into such detail delimiting the scope of this
commentary and raising questions which are beyond it, analysis
of the interpretation furnished by the court seems almost anti-
climactic. Nevertheless, this piece would be pointless without it.
The Louisiana Supreme Court took the position that it could
not render a decision under the Declaratory Judgments Act,
leading to its decision to render the "advisory opinion." The
court accordingly eschewed any interpretation of the mineral
reservation in question. Therefore, the opinion was limited to
an interpretation of the statute under each of the two interpre-
tations of the reservation urged by counsel for the respective
parties.
The interpretation urged by Leiter was, of course, that the
reservation in the deed of 1938 was not one for a fixed, maxi-
mum term such as fifteen or twenty-five years, but merely one
subject to a prescriptive or minimum term selected by the par-
ties in preference to that fixed by law. On the basis of this argu-
ment, for example, if the parties stated that a reserved mineral
servitude was to prescribe for non-user in five years, the only
difference between this and a reservation without such limita-
tion would be that prescription would run in half the normal
time. Thus, the five-year term should be construed as only a
substitution for the ten-year legal term, and the running of lib-
erative prescription thereon could be affected by any mode of
interruption, extension, or suspension applicable to a servitude
established without reference to an agreed period of limitation.
This argument contrasts with that advanced by the lessees,
who contended that the reservation was one for a fixed, maxi-
mum term, such as that found in Hodges v. Norton.' In such an
instance, it is accepted that where the parties fix a maximum
term for, say, twenty-five years, the laws of prescription are
applicable and the rights granted will expire in ten years absent
an effective interrupton, extension, or suspension of prescrip-
tion.1 7 But in such a case, it is held that even though there be
a use of the servitude the interest will terminate upon the run-
ning of the twenty-five year maximum term.18 Despite its for-
mal disavowal of intent to interpret the reservation in question,
the court stated, in setting forth the lessees' argument to the
16. 200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942).
17. Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942); Bodcaw Lumber
Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 167 La. 847, 120 So. 389 (1929).
18. See note 17 aupra.
[Vol. XXIII
PRIVATE LAW
effect that the reservation was for a fixed term as in Hodges v.
Norton,19 that "for what it is worth, our opinion is that it is
not."2
Assuming first the correctness of the defendants' interpreta-
tion of the reservation, the court stated that "since, in such a
case there is no question of prescription, Act 315 of 1940 is
Without application. ' 21 This statement alone is incomplete, and
what the court apparently meant, as exposed by its words in the
preceding paragraph, was that in this particular instance there
would be no question of prescription. In the preceding para-
graph, the opinion points out that where there is a fixed-term
reservation for a period in excess of ten years, Act 315 of 1940
would be applicable to maintain the reservation in force for the
fixed period, even though there should be no user of the rights
reserved. However, at the termination of the fixed period, the
rights would cease to exist. Applying this statement to the one
quoted above, and thus, to the reservation in question, the court
apparently meant to say that in the instance involved, the period
fixed by the contract would have expired and, in the event of a
conclusion that there was a maximum term reservation, Act 315
of 1940 would be inapplicable. The court went on to state in that
same paragraph that if the statute were applied in such an in-
stance, there would be an unconstitutional impairment of con-
tract under the provisions of Article IV, Section 15, of the Lou-
isiana Constitution of 1921.
Alternatively, the court stated that if the United States Su-
preme Court should conclude that the reservation was one of un-
certain and indefinite duration, and that it was the intention of
the parties to fix by contract the period of liberative prescrip-
tion as opposed to a maximum term, Act 315 of 1940 would be
applicable and constitutional under the Louisiana Constitution.
In rendering its opinion the Louisiana Supreme Court took
note of the background of Act 315 of 1940, pointing out that as
there had been some question as to the applicability of prescrip-
tive laws to sales of land to the federal government some land-
owners were accordingly reluctant to sell to the United States,
and that the legislature had clearly in mind the purpose of pro-
tecting these landowners, placing them on the same footing as
19. 200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942).
20. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 936, 132 So. 2d 845.
852 (1961).
. '21. Id. at 937, 132 So. 2d at 853.
1963 ',1 I,.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
landowners in other states, in which it is possible to make a min-
eral reservation in perpetuity. Two additional purposes for the
passage of the act were recognized: that severance taxes are a
major source of state revenue which would be lost on large
amounts of land if reservations in perpetuity were not legal;
and the state's interest in conservation and proper utilization of
its natural resources, as contemplated in the Louisiana Consti-
tution.
The court pointed out that the policies stated would not be
fully served if distinctions were drawn between contractually
fixed periods of prescription and the legal period. Reasoning
negatively from absence of any such distinction in the statute,
and relying also on the stated policies, it was concluded that
there is no such distinction in effect.
On the other hand, in considering the applicability of the
statute to fixed-term reservations, the court did not fully illumi-
nate its reasons for concluding that the statute is inapplicable,
but merely stated that in such a case the servitude would expire
at the end of the time fixed for its duration. From a strictly
logical standpoint, it seems that if one may reason negatively
that, as the statute does not draw distinctions between reserva-
tions for contractually fixed prescriptive periods less than ten
years and those for the legal prescriptive term, neither does it
draw any distinctions between those for a fixed term greater
than ten years and either of the other two types. Therefore, if
this failure of distinctions is to be accepted as a determinative
criterion, there seems to be something lacking.
Another consideration, possibly of greater moment, suggests
itself. In an instance in which the parties fix a maximum term
for the existence of a mineral reservation it may be inferred
that this result was negotiated, agreed upon, and reflected in the
consideration paid. By contrast, according to the history nar-
rated by the Louisiana Supreme Court, many persons who were
alienating their lands to the government were conveying for a
price clearly reflecting that the minerals were not included, and
some were apparently being told that the laws of prescription
did not apply to such sales or conveyances to the government.
The inference, then, would be that one who sells for a fixed
term contemplates that he will lose his minerals in any case
upon passage of the specified period of time. On the other hand,
he who sells and reserves without specification of maximum
[Vol. XXIII
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term does so in the hope that he can maintain his rights in ex-
istence, and perhaps in some instances in the past reservations
were made under the assurance by representatives of the vendee
that they were in perpetuity. Legislative relief for the latter
class seems justifiable, and it is not unreasonable to exclude
from the coverage of the statute those who contemplated at the
moment of their transfer that they would lose their rights upon
passage of a specified maximum term except to the extent that
their reservations will be preserved by the statute until the full
term has elapsed.
There is, therefore, a rather sound basis for the differentia-
tion made by the court between reservations for a fixed term
greater than ten years and an agreement by the parties upon a
period of limitation or prescription of less than the ten-year
legal prescriptive period.
As to the problem of constitutionality raised by the retro-
spective application of Act 315 of 1940, it is basic that periods
of prescription may be altered without such enactments being
declared unconstitutional for impairing contractual obliga-
tions.22 The Louisiana Supreme Court has previously upheld
Act 315 of 1940 against such an attack.28
The court stated that there would be impairment, how-
ever, if a particular reservation were determined to be for a
fixed term and the provisions of R.S. 9:5806A applied so as to
extend the rights beyond that term. Although the writer finds
no quarrel with the opinion of the court in this regard on the
basis of accepted principles of constitutional law, viewed ab-
stractly the problem seems to be more one of differentiating
degree of impairment rather than kind. There must necessarily
be a real if not a legal effect on the obligations of a contract
when a prescriptive period is altered retroactively, just as there
would be a real effect if Act 315 were applied to a fixed-term
reservation. Conceptual reasoning on the basis of the nature
of the "reversionary right" which exists upon creation of a min-
eral servitude is not, therefore, fully satisfactory. Yet it seems
to furnish the only legal basis for distinction. Accordingly, the
22. Whitney National Bank v. Little Creek Oil Co., 212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d
693 (1947); State v. Alden Mills, 202 La. 416, 12 So. 2d 204 (1943); Shreve-
port Longleaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 197 So. 566 (1940); De Armas
v. De Armas, 3 La. Ann. 526 (1848).
. 23. Whitney National Bank of New Orleans v. Little Creek Oil Co., Inc.,
212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d 693 (1947). See also United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90
F.Supp. 73 (E.D. La. 1950) ; 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951).
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
court reasoned that the reversionary right held by the :govern-
ment upon reservation of minerals by one of its vendors prior to
passage of the remedial statute of 1940 is no more than an ex-
pectancy or hope and not a vested right.24 , On the other hand, in
a fixed-term reservation the landowner has a vested right in the
reversion of the minerals, and to divest this right would, in the
court's eye, impair the obligations of the contract in question.25
This reasoning has one dangerous drawback. In pursuing its
policy of keeping minerals in commerce the Louisiana -Supreme
Court has held that the "reversionary right" of the landowner
holding property subject to an outstanding mineral servitude is
no more than a hope or expectancy, and this right is not an ob-
ject of commerce. 26  If, however, the contractual right to the
reversion of a fixed-term mineral interest is a "vested right,"
one may ask whether it is a right subject to commerce? If so,
then there is a possibility of circumvention of the established
policy of the court. Because, however, the court regards the
desirable end of keeping minerals in commerce as a matter of
public policy, it seems likely that an attempt at circumvention
by use of fixed-term reservations or grants would stand little
chance of success. Also, the undesirable features of the fixed-
term servitude, from the viewpoint of the servitude owner, make
any attempt of this kind unlikely.
JOINT LEASE-EXTENSION OF SERVITUDE
The opinion in Adam v. Johnson27 is a clear and concise ex-
position and application of the rules which have finally evolved
concerning the effect of execution of a joint lease by a land-
owner and a mineral owner upon running of liberative prescrip-
24. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954) ; Liberty Farms, inc.
v. Miller, 216 La. 1023, 45 So. 2d 610 (1950). See also United States v. Nebo
Oil Co., 190 F. 2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951). "The reversionary interest cases have
gone through a transition from dicta admitting the legal possibility of the creation
of a reversionary interest by a properly phrased contract, to an express state-
ment that it is settled that sales of reversionary interests cannot be made."
Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines: A Report to
the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, 25 TUL. L.
REV. 155, 183 (1951). It is noteworthy that these remarks by Professor Nabors.
were made prior to the decision rendered in Hicks v. Clark, supra.
25. "If the act should be held to be applicable in such a case so as to extend
the right or servitude beyond the time fixed by the contract for its duration, the
act would operate to impair the obligation of the contract between the parties,
and to divest vested rights, and hence would be unconstitutional." Leiter Min-
erals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 937, 132 So. 2d 845, 853 (1961).
26. Flicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954) ; Liberty Farms, Inc.
v. Miller, 216 La. 1023, 45 So. 2d 610 (1950).
27. 133 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
[Vol. XXIII
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tion. This development began with the decision rendered in
Mulhern v. Hayne,28 which in no uncertain terms stated that
execution of a joint lease by the landowner and servitude owner
constituted an acknowledgment interrupting prescription. The
cases subsequent to Mulhern disclose a difficult retreat from
this initial decision. 29 The withdrawal took a decisive turn in
the direction of the present judicial interpretation in Achee v.
C aillouet,30 in which the Supreme Court found it necessary to
state that in rendering the Mulhern decision it had not used the
term "interruption" as a legal term of art but merely in its
dictionary sense. This opened the way for subsequent decisions
which now rather clearly hold that execution of a joint lease by
a landowner and mineral servitude owner does not interrupt
liberative prescription but extends the life of the servitude,31
"at least for the primary term of the lease."3 2
The second aspect of this evolutionary development, also
noted in the Fourth Circuit opinion, centers upon the determina-
tion of whether the parties intended to sign a joint lease. Cases
subsequent to Mulhern v. Hayne33 develop the principle that the
mere fact that a document appears on its face to be a joint lease
in form is not conclusive proof that the parties so intended it.34
Thus, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the intent of the
parties. Evidentiary factors which have been considered in
reaching a conclusion on this issue of intent include different
times and places of signing,35 educational background,3 6 lack of
knowledge that the lease was to be signed by others in counter-
part,3 7 and insertion of the names of parties as joint lessors sub-
28. 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
29. See Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75
(1936); Kennedy v. Pelican Well Tool & Supply Co., 188 La. 811, 178 So. 359
(1938); English v. Blackman, 189 La. 255, 179 So. 306 (1938); Hightower v.
Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940) ; Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, .1
So. 2d 530 (1941) ; Baker v. Wilder, 204 La. 759, 16 So. 2d 346 (1943) ; Barns-
dall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69 So. 2d 21 (1953); Elkins v. Roseberry,
2.33 La. 59, 96 So. 2d 41 (1957).
30. 197 La. 313, 1 So. 2d 530 (1941).
31. Elkins v. Roseberry, 233 La. 59, 96 So. 2d 41 (1957) ; Barnsdall Oil
Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69 So. 2d 21 (1953) ; Nolen v. Bennett, 119 So. 2d 636
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
32. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69 So. 2d 21 (1953).
33. 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
34. See authorities subsequent to Mulhern v. Hayne cited in note 29 supra.
35. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69 So. 2d 21 (1953).
36. Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1 So. 2d 530 (1941) (on original hearing).
37. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69 So. 2d 21 (1953) ; Kennedy
v..Pelican Well Tool & Supply Co., 188 La. 811, 178 So. 359 (1938) (signature
by an agent without knowledge that other parties would be asked to sign).
1963];
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sequent to execution by the party claiming that he had no in-
tention to sign a joint lease.88
In the decision under discussion two factors were apparently
of some concern to the court in resolving the issue of intent.
First, the instrument itself disclosed that the parties had not
signed at the same time or place. Second, the lease had been
executed in counterpart. Analyzing the instrument the court
was disposed to disregard these two "suspicious circumstances"
because the lease specifically recited that the parties intended
to sign a joint lease and expressly authorized execution in coun-
terparts. Thus, in the absence of further evidence submitted by
the landowner, the court correctly held that the instrument was
a joint lease, the parties had so intended it, and the servitude
was consequently extended.
This decision raises a problem about which the jurisprudence
has thus far been decidedly unclear - that of allocating the bur-
den of persuading the trier of fact on the issue of intent. As the
servitude owner is the party taking the position that execution
of this instrument extended the life of his interest beyond the
normal prescriptive date, the burden of persuasion in this re-
gard should logically fall upon him. But what is necessary to
establish a prima facie case and require the landowner to come
forward with evidence?
Obviously, the Johnson decision holds that when the servi-
tude owner introduces a lease reciting that the parties intended
to sign a joint lease and authorizing execution in counterpart a
prima facie case has been established even though the instru-
ment discloses different times and places of signing and execu-
tion in counterparts. Further evidence by the landowner to re-
but the effect of the instrument would have been necessary to
overcome the effect of the instrument itself.
But where is the line to be drawn when factors present in
the Johnson case are pared away? If the servitude owner ad-
duces a lease which recites that it is a joint lease, should he be
deemed to have borne the burden of proving a prima facie case?
What if the instrument has no such designation but is merely a
standard lease form with the names of the landowner and servi-
tude owner typed in as lessors? What should be the effect in




either of these two cases if there has been execution at differ-
ent times and places, execution in counterparts, or both?
Certainly it is impossible to trace out all of the permutations
and combinations of disclosures which might be made by the
lease instrument and indicate a result for each. However, some
basic principles can be suggested. In doing so, some weight
should be given to the following considerations: (1) the well-
established principle that an individual must be responsible for
the contents of a document he signs; (2) the common practice
in the industry of having parties execute lease agreements at
different times and places; (3) the facility with which a land-
owner may testify that he did not intend to sign or know that he
was signing a joint lease, subjectively, and the difficulty of dis-
proving this assertion.
In the light of these considerations, then, it seems fair to
regard the servitude owner as having proved a prima facie case
by introduction of the lease in at least two situations. This
should clearly be so in the circumstances presented by the John.-
son case in which the lease expresses an intent to sign a joint
lease and authorizes execution in counterparts. Second, if the
lease is designated as a joint lease by title or in any other man-
ner, its introduction should constitute a prima facie case with-
out regard to time and place of execution or execution in coun-
terparts, even though there is no clause authorizing execution
in counterparts.3 9 In a situation of this kind, of course, if the
lease itself shows some evidence of tampering, such as the pos-
sibility that names of parties might have been inserted at differ-
ent times, a court might legitimately require some explanation
of these circumstances. But in the ordinary case in which there
is no such evidence of alteration, the common practices of dif-
ferent time and place of execution and execution in counterpart
39. It must be acknowledged that the Louisiana Supreme Court in Barns-
dall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 226, 69 So. 2d 21, 24 (1953) indicated that
the fact of different times and places of execution is in itself "sufficient to cast
disbelief that the parties contemplated the creation of a joint obligation and
warranted the introduction of parol evidence for the purpose of ascertaining their
true intent." However, considered as a whole the sentence seems rather clearly
to indicate that the phrase "cast disbelief" does not mean that the introduction
of a document designated as a joint lease would constitute a failure of proof
but rather, as stated, that a basis would be established for the introduction of
parol evidence. It seems reasonable to say that in accordance with the Barnsdall
decision, the introduction of a lease designated as a joint lease would constitute
a prima facie case, even though doubt was created by the different times and
places of execution, thus laying a foundation for the defendant to adduce evidence
to show lack of intent to execute a joint obligation.
19631
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
should not destroy the fact that the lessor-landowner has affixed
his name to what has every appearance of being a regularly
executed joint lease.
A more difficult situation arises when the lease is executed
on a standard form. There are strong considerations of fairness
weighing in favor of the conclusion that the introduction of
even a standard form with all names of parties typed or written
in without any apparent irregularity should constitute a prima
facie case regardless of the mode of execution. In such a situa-
tion it is simple for a landowner to allow introduction of the in-
strument, knowing full well that it was a joint lease and was so
intended, yet still win on the ground of failure of proof. How-
ever, Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller40 and other decisions 41 indicate
that the intention to sign a joint lease "must appear either from
the contract itself ...or, in cases where the language of the
lease does not plainly express such an intention, from extrane-
ous evidence submitted by the parties for the purpose of show-
ing their intent. ' 42 The lease involved in the Barnsdall case was
executed on a standard printed form. Therefore, one must con-
clude that if the instrument is a standard lease form it is at least
advisable to adduce extrinsic evidence showing an intent to sign
a joint lease to assure the establishment of a prima facie case.
The Johnson opinion naturally gives weight to the presence
of a clause in the lease authorizing execution in counterparts.
But a word of caution is appropriate concerning the weight to
be given this fact. Even in the absence of a lease provision such
as that in the Johnson case, the indication of intent to execute
a joint lease is of prime weight and mode of execution should
not destroy the evidentiary effect of the lease. Fairness requires
the party denying intent to sign a joint lease to come forward
with supporting evidence outside the lease instrument which
will convert these "suspicious circumstances" into a proper evi-
dentiary basis for a legal conclusion of lack of intent.
MINERAL SERVITUDE- RESERVATION OF POWER To LEASE
Dart v. Breitung,48 decided by the Court of Appeal for the
First Circuit, adds one more small piece to the puzzle of the
40. 224 La. 216, 69 So. 2d 21 (1953).
41. Elkins v. Roseberry, 233 La. 59, 96 So. 2d 41 (1957) ; Nolen v. Bennett,
119 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
42. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 226, 69 So. 2d 21, 24 (1953).
43. Dart v. Breitung, 136 So. 2d 501 (La. App. lst Cir. 1962).
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rights and obligations of servitude owner and landowner with
regard to the leasing of their interests. Plaintiff sold property
to defendant in 1950, reserving a one-fourth mineral interest
together with the exclusive power to lease both his interest and
that of the landowner for such periods and on such terms as
should be satisfactory to plaintiff. The parties were to share
equally in any bonuses and delay rentals.
Near the end of the ten-year prescriptive period, plaintiff
had an opportunity to lease. However, the prospective lessee
would not take the lease without the signature of defendant or,
alternatively, his ratification of the lease or of plaintiff's power
of attorney. As a result of defendant's refusal to do any of these
things, plaintiff was unable to let the property for mineral de-
velopment.
Plaintiff sought judgment decreeing that defendant's refusal
to sign or ratify the lease or ratify the power of attorney "inter-
rupted '4 4 the running of liberative prescription on plaintiff's
mineral interest. Alternatively, plaintiff prayed for judgment
declaring him to be empowered to grant an oil, gas, and mineral
lease for a period of ten years or less and retain one-half of the
bonus and rental payments, or as a last alternative for the sum
of $847.39, presumably the amount of the bonus money which
would have been retained by plaintiff had there been a lease.
The court of appeal rejected plaintiff's demands. In consid-
ering whether plaintiff was entitled to any damages, the court
gave determinative effect to the fact that defendant was in no
way obligated to sign or ratify any lease or ratify a power of
attorney.
Of principal significance in this case, however, is the re-
jection of plaintiff's argument that defendant's refusal to sign
or ratify the lease or a power of attorney wrought a suspension
of liberative prescription under Article 792 of the Louisiana
Civil Code.45 The court is not precise in distinguishing the prob-
lem of interruption of prescription from suspension of prescrip-
44. Examination of the plaintiff's pleadings indicates that it was initially
contended defendants' inaction interrupted prescription. However, this position
was altered and plaintiff urged instead that there had been a suspension of pre-
scription under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 792 (1870).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 792 (1870) : "If the owner of the estate to whom
the servitude is due is permitted from using it by an obstacle which he can neither




tion and this results in some confusion. As one reason for re-
jecting plaintiff's argument, it was stated that the mineral res-
ervation in question provided that only the beginning of drill-
ing operations prior to the prescriptive date could interrupt the
running of liberative prescription. This does not have anything
to do with the possibility of a suspension of prescription, how-
ever, which might result from issuance of a conservation order
46
or the creation of some obstacle by act of the landowner.
4 7
It is suggested that there may be more merit in the position
of plaintiff in this case than met the eye of the court. Problems
of this kind seem to be arising with greater frequency, and there
is considerable discussion of the possibility that some fiduciary
principle may be applicable to the relationship between land-
owner and mineral owner. 48 It is a statement of the obvious to
point out that a servitude is granted for a period of ten years,
in the absence of agreement to the contrary, and not for eight,
nine, or nine and one-half years. Therefore, it seems that al-
though the landowner should certainly not be required to do any-
thing prejudicial to his interest in seeing the minerals revert to
him, he should not at the same time be allowed to deal unfairly
with property over which he has the executive power, 49 to the
46. Boddie v. Drewett, 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
47. Although not discussed in terms of suspension by obstacle, the factual
situation presented in McMurrey v. Grey, 216 La. 903, 45 So. 2d 73 (1950) is
clearly one in which the conduct of the landowner in padlocking the entrance to
servitude property prevented the entry of the servitude owner's lessee for the
purpose of continuing drilling operations. This would seem to fall squarely within
the obstacle theory. In addition, several other cases suggest that the landowner's
physical resistance to exercise of a mineral servitude suspends liberative prescrip-
tion: Patton's Heirs v. Moseley, 186 La. 1088, 173 So. 772 (1937) ; Gayoso Co. v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677 (1933) ; Clark v. Tensas
Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931) ; Myers v. Cooke, 175 La. 30,
142 So. 790 (1932). See also Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude and
Royalty Doctrines: Report to the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State
Law Institute, 25 TUL. L. REV. 485, 489 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Nabors].
48. Nabors, at 485; Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 867 (1962); Williams, The Fi-
duciary Principle in the Law of Oil and Gas, 13TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL
& GAS LAW & TAXATION 201, 239-52 (1962); 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, Oil &
GAS LAW §§ 339.2-339.3 (1959) ; Everett, The Executive Right to Lease, 3R1
ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 509 (1957); Martz &
Hames, Implied Rights of Royalty Owners, 3RD ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN
MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 195 (1957) ; Jones, Problems Presented by the Separa-
tion of the Exclusive Leasing Power from Ownership of Land, Minerals or Roy-
alty, 2ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 271 (1951)
Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1948).
49. Although not based directly on the existence of any fiduciary relationship
between a landowner with the executive right and a servitude owner, the deci-
sion rendered in Namie v. Namie, 134 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) takes a
big step toward holding that during the latter days of existence of a servitude a




prejudice of a servitude owner, or to hinder the reasonable exer-
cise of the rights of the servitude owner.
In these cases, leasing practices place the vendor of land
wishing to reserve a portion of the minerals in a difficult posi-
tion. If he gives the vendee the executive power, he runs the
risk of being dealt with unfairly in the latter days of existence
of his interest ;5o if he retains the executive power, a prospective
lessee may understandably be unwilling, as here, to invest in a
lease without some assurance that the landowner's interest will
be under lease and will remain so if prescription should run on
the servitude prior to operations which could be construed as a
user; if the vendor takes a third possible course and retains only
the power to deal with his own interest, he may find that in the
twilight of his servitude the landowner will refuse to lease his
interest in the property and a prospective lease will again be
lost. As a matter of conveyancing technique, of course, the pref-
erable approach for either landowner or mineral owner taking
a power to lease is specifically to obligate the other party to
ratify any leases which may be executed under the power,51 but
this is not always done and may not always be possible. These
are, therefore, problems which deserve some serious considera-
tion by the courts.
Regarding the strict legalities involved in the Dart case it
should be noted that Article 792, which is the basic provision on
suspension by obstacle, is buttressed in this situation by Article
777, which provides in part that "the owner of the estate which
owes the servitude can do nothing tending to diminish its use,
or to make it more inconvenient." True enough, this article
seems to refer to active hindrance by the owner of the servient
estate rather than mere passive refusal to act as in the Dart
case. However, it is like the proverbial ostrich to deny that in
such a situation the landowner is effectively foreclosing the
servitude owner from the exercise, or at least the opportunity
for the exercise, of his rights.
This discussion is not intended as any violent criticism of
the Dart opinion, for it does appear from the facts there present
that as intransigent as the landowner may have been, the servi-
50. Namie v. Namie, 134 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
51. This was actually done in the conveyance involved in Nolen v. Bennett,
119 So. 2d 636, 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960): "The said W. H. Bennett binds
and obligates himself, if requested, to ratify such oil, gas and mineral leases as
may be executed by said J. S. Nolen, his heirs, successors, or assigns."
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tude owner may have been trying to steer him into a joint lease
"trap." This the mineral owner certainly had no right to expect,
but nevertheless the plight of the servitude owner who makes
a reasonable request for execution of a document not prejudicial
to the landowner's interest but sufficient to protect the lessee
and allow the servitude owner his chance to develop deserves
very careful and perhaps favorable consideration by the courts.
MINERAL LEASES - SHUT-IN ROYALTIES - DELAY RENTALS
The opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Davis v.
Laster5 2 casts light on the nature of the shut-in royalty clause.
This decision will be treated in a Note in a future issue of this
Review. However, certain of the problems bear illumination in
this commentary.
The case centered upon three determinations: whether a
lessee, upon completion and shutting in of a gas well for lack of
a market during the primary term, is bound to pay shut-in roy-
alties or may at his option maintain the lease in force by pay-
ment of delay rentals; if payment of shut-in royalties is obliga-
tory, whether acceptance by the lessor of delay rentals for nine
years prior to tender of shut-in royalties at the end of the pri-
mary term should excuse the lessee's failure to pay shut-in royal-
ties; and whether the well in question was one "producing gas
only" as contemplated by the shut-in royalty clause.
Plaintiff, purchaser of the property from the vendee of the
original lessor's heir, accepted but one of the nine delay rental
payments personally. Prior to lapse of the primary term lessee
made a tender of shut-in royalties. Nine months later, plaintiff
returned the shut-in royalty check with a written demand for
cancellation.
The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held that upon
completion of a well capable of production the right to pay delay
rentals ceases and the lease must be maintained by payment of
production royalties or, if the well is shut in, by further drilling
operations or the substitute for production contemplated by the
lease in question- shut-in royalties. 53 Cancellation of the lease
was granted on the ground that as shut-in royalties are concep-
tually the same as production royalties under the type lease in-
52. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
53. Davis v. Laster, 130 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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v0lved, there could be no distinction in the legal consequences of
unjustified failure to pay. Under the doctrine evolving from
Melancon v. Texas Co. 54 and Bollinger v. Texas Co.55 nine years
was deemed an unjustified length of time. No question of de-
fault was raised as defendants denied the existence of any obli-
gation to pay shut-in royalties.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision as to the obliga-
tory nature of the shut-in royalty clause but refused cancella-
tion on grounds discussed below. Emphasis was placed on the
fact of definition of shut-in royalties in the same paragraph of
the lease setting forth the obligation to pay production royalties.
By contrast, the right to pay delay rentals, set forth in a separ-
ate paragraph, was granted to secure the privilege of deferring
drilling operations during the primary term. In response to an
argument that the lease granted the privilege of resuming rent-
als after the drilling of a dry hole or cessation of production
once established, the court replied that a shut-in well is clearly
not a dry hole and within the intendment of the lease production
did not cease upon shut-in of the well. Further supporting the
basic construction of the shut-in royalty provision, the court
stated that as the shut-in payments were intended by the parties
as royalties, holders of non-participating royalty interests would
be entitled to share in such payments. To allow the lessee to
elect to pay rentals instead would, therefore, permit him to fore-
close these royalty owners from revenues to which they were
entitled under the contract.
In denying cancellation, reliance was placed on Article 1956
of the Louisiana Civil Code,56 providing that when the intent
of the parties to a contract is doubtful, the construction put
upon it by the parties in execution by both or by one with the
express or implied consent of the other furnishes a proper basis
for interpretation. Citing the varying views of courts and
scholars as to whether payment of shut-in royalties is obligatory
or optional,5 7 the court concluded that doubt existed as to the
54. 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956).
55. 232 La. 637, 95 So. 2d 132 (1957).
56. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1956 (1870) : "When the intent of the parties is
doubtful, the construction put upon it, by the manner in which it has been
executed by both, or by one with the express or implied assent of the other,
furnishes a rule for its interpretation."
57. Malone, The Shut-in Royalty, 11 BAYLOR L. REV. 19 (1959) ; Moses,
Recent Problems in Connection With Shut-in Gas Royalty Provisions in Oil d
Gas Leases, 10 LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1959) ; Moses, Problems in Connection With
Shut-in Gas Royalty Provisions in Oil d Gas Leases: Part II, 27 TUL. L. REV.
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intent of the parties. Acceptance of rental payments by the
original lessor and her successors, including plaintiff, was
viewed as tacit consent to this mode of execution and the inter-
pretation by the parties was allowed to govern.
Although there is controversy on this point, 8 the decision of
the court on the obligatory character of the shut-in royalty
clause is sound and well-supported by its interpretation of the
lease. However, there is something rather curious in a decision
which in a crisp, straightforward manner interprets a contract
as outlined above and then, as a vehicle for reaching an equitable
result, states that the meaning of the provision in question is
doubtful, permitting utilization of the parties' manner of execu-
tion as a basis for interpretation. It is incongruous to interpret
the clause as obligatory and then call it "doubtful."
At one point the opinion states that "there is ample authority
in our law to support the proposition that the parties to this
lease by their conduct in its execution varied its terms." 59 Ar-
ticle 1956, however, does not concern variance of the terms of a
contract by execution, but interpretation of otherwise doubtful
language. Further, Articles 181760 and 1818,61 relating to silence
as a mode of creating obligations, also cited in the opinion, do
not appear to have been designed for application in this in-
stance. Reliance on the provisions cited, therefore, does not
offer firm support for the decision.
Two lines of authorities suggest themselves as valid support
for the equitable result reached by the court. Both are embodied
in the opinion, but neither is fully elucidated. One is suggested
by the above quotation regarding variance of the contract by
conduct of the parties. This principle has been applied in a
number of cases involving payment of rent in a manner or at a
478 (1953) ; Moses, Problems in Connection with Shut-in Gas Royalty Provisions
in Oil d Gas Leases: Part 1, 23 TuL. L. REv. 374 (1949) ; Comment, 24 TE. L.
REv. 478 (1946).
58. See authorities cited in note 57 supra.
59. Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 751, 138 So. 2d 558, 563 (1962).
60. LA- CIVIL CODE art. 1817 (1870) : "Silence and inaction are also, under
some circumstances, the means of showing an assent that creates an obligation;
if, after the termination of a lease, the lessee continue in possession, and the
lessor be inactive and silent, a complete mutual obligation for continuing the
lease, is created by the act of occupancy of the tenant on the one side, and the
inaction and silence of the lessor on the other."
61. Id. art. 1818: "Where the law does not create a legal presumption of
consent from certain facts, then, as in the case of other simple presumptions, it




time or place other than that specified by ordinary lease con-
tracts or implied by law. 2 In such instances, the courts have
refused cancellation because the parties have by mutual acqui-
escence varied the terms of the contract, and this variance can-
not be altered without mutual consent. This group of cases
springs from older decisions concerning execution of insurance
contracts.6 The insurance cases reflect reliance on decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and courts of other states.
64
Apparently, no code authority has ever been cited for this line
of jurisprudence; rather it derives from the equitable principle
of estoppel by conduct.
Application of the above principle to Davis v. Laster0 6 is dif-
ficult as the case involves substitution of one obligation for
another rather than simply variance in the mode of execution
of an obligation. Still, if acquiescence in a course of conduct
can result in variance of the terms of a contract as to mode of
performance, it is but one step beyond to hold that conduct can
estop a party from insisting on cancellation for failure to per-
form one obligation of a contract when for nine years there has
been acceptance of another act as accomplishing the same func-
tion, i.e., maintaining the lease in force. This is particularly
true here as the lessee was paying $180.00 annually in delay
rentals as opposed to $50.00 shut-in royalties, and the lessor was
receiving $67.50 as opposed to $18.75 annually as owner of a
three-eighths interest.
The Second Circuit was unwilling to find estoppel, as plain-
tiff had accepted only one rental check and the court felt that
proof was lacking that he knew of the shut-in well. However, if
62. Saxton v. Para Rubber Co., 166 La. 308, 117 So. 235 (1928) ; Bonnabel
v. Metairie Cypress Co., 129 La. 928, 57 So. 271 (1912) ; Standard Brewing Co.
v. Anderson, 121 La. 936, 46 So. 926 (1908).
63. See Gunther v. New Orleans Cotton Exchange Mutual Aid Ass'n, 40 La.
Ann. 776, 5 So. 65 (1888). See also Fitzpatrick v. Mutual and Benevolent Life
Insurance Ass'n, 25 La. Ann. 443 (1873).
64. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Doster, 106 U.S. 30 (1882) ; Insurance Co. v.
Eggleston, 96 U.S. 572 (1877) ; Home Life Insurance Co. v. Pierce, 75 Ill. 426
(1874) ; Thompson v. St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Co., 52 Mo. 469 (1873).
65. "Plaintiff relies on the strictly technical ground that failure to pay rent
on the day it is due puts an end to the lease, and such is ordinarily the rule;
but such rule cannot have application in a lease like this where the lessor has by
his conduct led the tenant to believe that a delay of a few days would make no
difference." Standard Brewing Co. v. Anderson, 121 La. 935, 939, 46 So. 926,
928 (1908). In Gunther v. New Orleans Cotton Exchange Mutual Aid Ass'n, 40
La. Ann. 776, 5 So. 65 (1888), cited by the court in the Standard Brewing Co.
decision, the Supreme Court cites BxFLOw, EsTopFrL (1882), as authority for
its holding.
66. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
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the principle of variance by acquiescence in a course of conduct
is to be applied, the variance was established long before plain-
tiff became lessor, and he would not be entitled to alter the
established course of conduct unilaterally.
Both the dissenting judge in the court of appeal 7 and the
Supreme Court point to another line of authorities in support
of the position that cancellation of the lease should not be grant-
ed."" These cases enunciate the principle that "in Louisiana, the
right to dissolve a lease is subject to judicial control according
to circumstances .... This Court has not, and will not, penalize
a litigant lessee by dissolving a lease held technically in default
when there is a bona fide defense." 69 The idea is not completely
unlike the estoppel principle discussed above and entails some
of the same factors as prerequisites to its application.
The line traces back through Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 7 0
in which the court refused cancellation of a sand and gravel
lease because, though mistaken in deducting severance taxes
from rent or royalty payments, the lessee had acted in good
faith and with reasonable legal basis. This decision in turn re-
lies on a case involving change in destination of leased premises
by a tenant.71 In the latter opinion, reference is made to the
writings of Troplong and Duvergier.7 2 In his treatment of leas-
ing and hiring of things Troplong states that the right to can-
cellation of a lease for abuse or change in destination of the
thing should be subject to the power of the judge to weigh the
circumstances and give the lessor satisfaction "through gentler
means"73 when it appears that cancellation of the lease contract
would be too harsh a penalty.
67. Gladney, J., in Davis v. Laster, 130 So. 2d 479, 488 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961).
68. Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 25 So. 2d 906 (1946);
Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931). The court also
cites Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34 (1948).
Although this decision applies a principle akin to that involved in the other cases
cited above, it relies for authority on decisions of other jurisdictions. Therefore,
it is not technically in the line of authorities under discussion. Also cited were
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 46 So. 2d 907 (1950) and
Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V.S. & T.R.R., 222 La. 383, 62 So. 2d 615 (1953). Both
of these decisions seem inappropriate in the present situation.
69. Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 950, 25 So. 2d 906, 908
(1946).
70. 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931).
71. Sieward v. Denechaud, 120 La. 720, 45 So. 561 (1908).
72. Id. at 730, 45 So. at 564.
73. TROPLONG, LE DROIT CIVIL, DE L'ECHANGE ET DU LOUAGE, 316 (1859):
"The reader is now sufficiently enlightened on the complaints which can be made




This idea, besides having the advantage of some basis in the:
civil law, is appealing in cases such as Davis v. Laster,7 4 for it
honestly admits the existence of a breach of contract, but ac-
knowledges that in some circumstances cancellation is unneces-
sarily onerous. Despite the soundness of this principle, attention
should be given to its self-contained problem: what are proper
circumstances? Certain broad generalizations can be made from
the cases, and they are here suggested with the acknowledged
danger of oversimplification.
Conduct of the lessee may be judged by two general criteria.
First, there is a rigid requirement of good faith.75 Second, his
conduct should be reasonable under the circumstances. 76 Rea-
sonableness may be judged by such standards as the degree of
departure from the contract and the soundness of any legal posi-
tion which he may have taken with regard to the meaning of
the contract or legal effect of his action. When a legal dispute
is involved, lack of binding precedent and action on advice of
counsel might be of weight in determining reasonableness.
Similarly, the lessor's position may be measured. Of course,
it should be possible to make him whole by awarding damages,
77
if any have been suffered. Also, the degree of damage or incon-
venience suffered should be considered. 78 In Davis v. Laster,79
for example, it was clear that plaintiff had not only suffered no
"These complaints give him the action ex locato for damages and interest, or
for cancellation of the lease. But judges should have the power to weigh the
circumstances, to determine whether cancellation would be too rigorous a penalty,
and whether there are ways of giving satisfaction to the lessor by gentler means."
(Translation by the present author.)
74. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
75. Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 950, 25 So. 2d 906 (1946);
Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931).
76. In Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 950, 25 So. 2d 906, 908
(1946), the court stated that it was "not unreasonable for the lessee to await
judicial interpretation of plaintiff's demands." In Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co.,
172 La. 828, 831, 135 So. 372, 373 (1931), the court stated that "when the ten-
ant has reasonable grounds for thinking that he does not owe all of the rent
claimed by the landlord, it would be a harsh rule to turn him out because he
made some error in good faith; and, as above said, courts will exercise some dis-
cretion in such cases."
77. Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 25 So. 2d 906 (1946);
Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931) ; Sieward v. Dene-
chaud, 120 La. 720, 45 So. 561 (1908). The implication that an award of dam-
ages should be adequate to make the plaintiff whole is clear in the passage of the
work of TROPLONG quoted in note 73 supra.
78. "The destination in the use of this building is not changed to a prejudicial
extent, in so far as plaintiff is concerned; at any rate, not to such an extent as
would justify us in annulling the lease." Sieward v. Denechaud, 120 :La. 720,
730, 45 So. 561, 564 (1908).
79. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
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damage but had indeed profited. The last criterion suggested,
and one strongly similar to the estoppel authorities, is the avail-
ability of opportunities for demanding adherence to the letter of
the contract.80 This last measure has not been linked directly to
the problem of default, and perhaps it should not be.
Caution should be exercised in utilizing this control over
the right to obtain cancellation. It is all too obvious that it
would be dangerous to allow a party to escape the penalty of
forfeiture in every instance in which he fails to pay royalties
or disagrees with another as to the meaning of their agreement
or claims a split of authority as to the legal effect thereof. Such
a policy would be unjust and impossible of proper administra-
tion. The court has, however, stated that the circumstances
warranting application of this principle must appear of record
with the greatest and most convincing clarity.
The Davis decision's adherence to the principle that con-
siderations of equity can prevent forfeiture is of more than
passing significance to the evolving doctrine under Melancon v.
Texas Co.8 and Bollinger v. Texas Co.82 concerning cancellation
for nonpayment of royalties. Continued acceptance of delay
rentals in the Davis case and absence of evidence of refusal to
pay upon request were viewed as distinguishing factors. This
portion of the decision seems to make some use of the criteria
indicated above and may point the way for drawing some needed
lines in the royalty cases. There are elements of willfulness in
the conduct of the lessees in Melancon and Bollinger which
should be carefully distinguished from situations in which there
is reasonable, good faith error or a soundly based but ultimately
incorrect legal position.
There is also a moral for the lease draftsman in the Davis
decisions. An able practitioner has suggested that there might
be a basis for a different interpretation if the shut-in payments
were designated "shut-in rentals" and defined in the paragraph
80. Certainly the period of nine years during which delay rentals were paid
in Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962) offered ample opportunity
for a demand to pay shut-in royalties rather than delay rentals. This criterion
is not rigid and need not always be present. No mention of it was made and
indeed it was lacking in both Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 25
So. 2d 906 (1946) and Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372
(1931), in both of which it was the reasonableness of lessee's legal position which
resulted in refusal of cancellation.
81. 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956).
82. 232 La. 637, 95 So. 2d 132 (1957).
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relating to delay rentals.8 An agreement so drafted presents
interesting stuff for conjecture as to whether the court will
give some functional, conceptual definition to the shut-in pay-
ment or leave its definition and application entirely within the
discretion of the contracting parties.
The third point of note in this decision is the lessor's con-
tention that the well in question was not one "producing gas
only" as contemplated by the shut-in royalty provision. On the
basis of evidence that some condensate had been produced and
sold, it was urged that the shut-in provision was inapplicable.
Whether this claim of forfeiture was based on failure to pay
royalties on the condensate or failure to have a producing well
at the end of the primary term is unclear. Plaintiff's pleadings
indicate he had the latter in mind,8 4 but the court seems to
have acted on the former basis. s5 In any event, the court refused
to go behind the Commissioner of Conservation's designation
as a gas well in the absence of evidence that the condensate
was produced in paying quantities.
Of course, it is difficult to see how, in the absence of a re-
cycling operation, condensate could have been produced in
significant quantities without production of the gas as well.
However, assuming, as the court did, that there was some pro-
duction, the conclusion reached is sound. If production is utilized
to maintain a lease, it must be in paying quantities. 6 If pro-
duction of condensate was sufficient to maintain the lease,
the lessee was under obligation to pay royalties. If none were
paid for a period of nine years running beyond the primary
term, there would be a strong basis for cancellation. 87 If, how-
ever, the production was not in paying quantities, payment of
production royalties would not maintain the lease. If a gas well
capable of production in paying quantities produced a limited
but not paying amount of condensate, as most do, to say that
83. Cousin, Review of Recent Jurisprudence, in 10th ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
MINERAL LAW (1963).
84. Article 21 of plaintiff's petition states that the lease should be cancelled
"because of the failure of defendants to produce oil, gas and other minerals in
merchantible [sic] quantities." Record, page 9, Davis v. Laster, 130 So. 2d 479
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
85. Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 766, 138 So. 2d 558, 568 (1962).
86. Vance v. Burley, 215 La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949); Coyle v. North
American Oil Consolidated, 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942) ; Logan v. Tholl Oil
Co., 189 La. 645, 180 So. 473 (1938) ; Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139,
108 So. 314 (1926).
87. Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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this is not a "gas well" would prohibit the lessee from main-
taining the lease in force beyond the primary term by any means
when he has a potentially paying gas well on hand and a sizable
investment in the lease.88 To deny applicability of the shut-in gas
royalty clause would be basically unsound policy resulting in its
virtual emasculation.
MANDAMUS To COMPEL PAYMENT OF ROYALTIES OR
OTHER SUMS DUE
In State ex rel. Superior Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission
Corp., 9 the Louisiana Supreme Court faced the problem of con-
struing the Louisiana statutes forbidding withholding payment
of rentals, royalties, or other sums due to a party holding an
interest in minerals or under a lease from which minerals are
purchased above ground 0 Defendant company was the pur-
chaser under a gas purchase contract of all of the production
from a well located on a forced unit including land under lease
by plaintiff. The purchase contract had been confected prior
to inclusion of the plaintiff's lease acreage in the unit by the
Commissioner of Conservation. Proper filing of the contract
with the Federal Power Commission had been completed, and
the sale had been permanently certificated. The Commissioner's
order fixed the share of production to which plaintiff was en-
titled. Plaintiff sought by this action to compel payment by
the gas purchaser of the value of its share of the unit produc-
tion based upon the prices fixed by the gas purchase contract.
In filing the suit and throughout its litigation, plaintiff stated
that it accepted the price fixed by the contract filed with the
Federal Power Commission.
Citing past decisions establishing the principle that to secure
a writ of mandamus ordering payment of royalties or other
sums due the amount must be definite and certain,91 the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court sustained an exception of no cause of
action filed by defendant and held that the amount due was not
certain and therefore the remedy of mandamus under the
88. "A holding that the constructive production provision applies only to wells
producing no liquid condensate would render that provision almost nugatory."
Vernon v. Union Oil Co., 270 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1959).
89. 242 La. 315, 136 So. 2d 55 (1961).
90. LA. R.S. 30:105-107 (1950).
91. State ex rel. Brown v. United Gas Public Service Co., 197 La. 616, 2
So. 2d 41 (1941) ; State ex rel. Boykin v. Hope Producing Co., 167 So. 506 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1936).
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statutes was not available. Chief Justice Fournet and Associate
Justice McCaleb dissented on the ground that although the
exact figure of plaintiff's claim was not predetermined, it could
be fixed by simple, mathematical calculation, utilizing the just
and equitable share of plaintiff, the amount of total production,
and the contract price.
The prior decisions relied upon are quite sound in that the
writ of mandamus should not be allowed where a party cannot
show a liquidated, or readily liquidated, claim. Both of these
decisions involved claims for additional royalties over and above
the amount stated in the lease on the ground that the market
value of the gas was greater than the amount stated in the
lease contract as the basis for computation of production roy-
alties.
Two inquiries are necessary to a consideration of the court's
recent decision. First, what is a fixed and certain amount?
Second, does the claim here in question fit the general defini-
tion? One of the dissenting Justices equated the requirement
of a fixed and certain claim with a "liquidated" claim.92  Pre-
sumably this is what is contemplated by the phrase "definite
and certain." 93 There is strong basis in the law of this and other
jurisdictions for the position that to be liquidated a claim need
not be predetermined in amount, particularly if it can be fixed
by simple mathematical computation.9 4 Apparently the Supreme
92. Assoicate Justice McCaleb, in State em rel. Superior Oil Co. v. Texas Gas
Transmission Corp., 242 La. 315, 333, 136 So. 2d 55, 61 (1962).
93. "The Court of Appeal in the Boykin case, supra, observed that mandamus
is an extraordinary remedy, that resort to it to compel or enforce unliquidated
obligations was never intended or admitted .. " (Emphasis added.) State ex rel.
Superior Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 242 La. 315, 324, 136 So. 2d
55, 58 (1962).
94. The jurisprudence in Louisiana concerning definition of a liquidated claim
relates almost wholly to the right to compensation granted by the Louisiana Civil
Code. Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code the debts in question must be equally
liquidated. The leading case considering the problem of what constitutes a liqui-
dated claim for this purpose states that the judge should, before allowing compen-
sation, "examine whether the party offering it, can establish it immediately, or
at the latest, within ten days." Caldwell v. Davis, 2 Mart,(N.S.) 135, 137-38
(La. 1824). See also Saunier v. Saunier, 217 La. 607, 47 So. 2d 19 (1950);
Havard v. Stone, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 126 (La. 1826) ; Carter v. Morse, 8 Mart.(O.S.)
398 (La. 1820) ; Olinde Hardware & Supply Co. v. Ramsey, 98 So. 2d 835 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1957). In Saunier, aupra, and Olinde, supra, reference is made to
Carter v. Morse, supra, at 399-400, which states "a debt, says Pothier, is liqui-
dated when it appears that something is due, and how much. . . . [A] contested
debt, therefore, is not a liquidated one; and so cannot be set off, unless he who
claims to set it off, has the proof in his hands, and be ready to prove it promptly
and summarily." For authorities in other jurisdictions holding that a claim is
liquidated when it may be calculated according to established market values, or
rule or criterion established by the parties or fixed by law, or from data given
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Court was unwilling to regard the present claim as capable of
being fixed by mathematical calculation.
Obviously, to be subject to determination by simple calcula-
tion a sum must be based on known numerical factors. Involved
here are (1) the amount of production for the unit, (2) the
share of unit production to which plaintiff's lease acreage was
entitled, (3) the price. The existence of the first two of these
factors was apparently unquestioned; it was lack of the third
which caused the court to deny plaintiff's claim.
It must be admitted that in the earlier decisions the criteria
for computation of the payment due were the same, but the
definite character of the third factor has been radically affected
by the passage and evolution of the Natural Gas Act 5 One of
the cases relied on was decided in 1936, prior to passage of this
act, and the other in 1941, thirteen years prior to the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin,9 6 requiring the Federal Power Commission to regu-
late well-head prices of natural gas sold in interstate commerce.
In the case in question, the regulations of the Federal Power
Commission prohibited plaintiff from filing rate schedules as
it was a non-signatory co-owner of the gas being taken under
the contract already filed with and permanently certificated by
the CommissionY7 The federal regulatory scheme by which the
rates for well-head sales of gas for use in interstate commerce
are fixed can reasonably be regarded as establishing a known
and definite price for the gas purchased by defendant, a price
which the parties could not vary except by administrative pro-
cedures looking toward a future increase. Therefore, the third
factor of price necessary to a mathematical computation of the
amount of the debt to plaintiff in this instance is present,
whereas the same regulatory scheme fixing rates for well-head
sales was not present in the two earlier cases cited. It is sug-
gested that if presented with the same situation in the future,
the court would be well within the bounds of propriety if it
adopted an opinion opposite to that rendered in this case.
Other interesting legal problems as to the relationship be-
tween plaintiff, the unit operator, and the gas purchaser were
from which damages can be calculated, see 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counter Clam
§43 (1953).
95. 15 U.S.C. 717 (1938).
96. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
97. 18 C.F.R. §154.9(d) (1961).
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raised on the merits and disposed of in the trial court.98 They
are not discussed here as the court's decision rested on the ex-
ception and no issues on the merits were resolved.
OTHER DECISIONS
Several other noteworthy decisions were rendered by the
Louisiana courts during the 1961-62 term.9 9 However, they are
not discussed in this symposium because they either have been' °°
or will be the subjects of treatment in other issues of this
Review. In addition to Davis v. Laster'0 ' two others of the
more important of these cases, Odom v. Union Producing Co.'02




In 1954, pursuant to authority granted by a 1948 constitu-
tional amendment, the legislature authorized the Department of
Highways to file a "declaration of taking" and thus to take pos-
session and title of property for highway purposes prior to a
final judgment fixing value in expropriation proceedings.'
98. Obviously this commentary has dealt only with the problem whether there
was a fixed and certain sum involved. If the court had decided that a liquidated
claim was presented, rather complex problems as to the legal relationship arising
from the appointment of a unit operator by the Commissioner of Conservation
would have been presented for decision. On the merits, defendant was contending
that it had paid the unit operator for all of the production from the well and was
therefore freed of any obligation to plaintiff. There is some question whether
defendant could pay the unit operator appointed by a conservation order and thus
relieve itself of any obligation to pay plaintiff for its just and equitable share
of production directly.
99. Odom v. Union Production Co., 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962) ; Melan-
con v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Pierce v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Namie v. Namie, 134 So. 2d
572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
100. Melancon v. Cheramie, supra note 99, is considered in the student Com-
ment, 23 LA. L. REv. 106, 111-16 (1962), and Namie v. Namie, supra note 98,
is considered in the student Note, 22 LA. L. REv. 867 (1962).
101. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
102. 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962).
103. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
*Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. LA.' R.S. 48:441-460 (Supp. 1962). This was pursuant to express consti-
tutional authority. LA. CO NST. art. VI, § 19.1, as amended in 1948.
